Rapid Support Forces

Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Darfur-based paramilitary group in Sudan. The RSF was established in 2013 by the government to fight Sudanese rebels. After defeating those forces, the group grew into such a powerful and integral component of Sudan’s defenses that it came to challenge Sudan’s official military, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The RSF and the SAF have been engaged in a war for supremacy since April 15, 2023, devastating the country.

Origins

The Rapid Support Forces is the latest iteration of a fighting force frequently employed by the government of Sudan since the early 1980s: the nomadic men of eastern Chad and the Sudanese region of Darfur. Originally, these Arabs and Arabic-speaking nomads were armed by Libya and Sudan, respectively, to serve as auxiliary troops in Chad, which was then experiencing a civil war. By the time a truce was called in the Chadian conflict in September 1987, however, these “militias” were engaged in yet another civil war, this time between the central government in Sudan’s capital of Khartoum and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels. In return for assisting the Sudanese government against the rebels, the militias received supplies and free rein along the Chad-Sudan border. This state of affairs continued throughout the 1990s.

More rebel groups launched attacks against the state in 2002. The next year, a string of rebel victories led Sudan’s military intelligence to marshal the Arab and Arabic-speaking nomads, now known as the Janjaweed, into a more centralized and effective force capable of rebuffing the government’s enemies. The Janjaweed was brutal, and its tactics for demoralizing the enemy included terrorizing the civilian population. Although international pressure led Sudan to agree multiple times from 2004 onward to disarm the Janjaweed, the government did not follow through. Many Janjaweed members remained active, and others were absorbed into other state security forces over the years.

Establishment of the RSF

In 2013 Sudanese Pres. Omar al-Bashir formalized the role of some of the Janjaweed in the RSF and appointed Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo—widely known as Hemedti (“Little Mohamed”) for his youthful appearance—as its commander. The RSF was initially under the authority of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), but a 2017 law made the RSF part of the SAF and under the command of the president.

Campaigns and operations

The RSF was heavily involved in the government’s Operation Decisive Summer military campaign in South Darfur and North Darfur, the first phase of which began in late February 2014 and lasted until early May. During the campaign, the RSF and SAF, along with other militia groups, worked together to eliminate armed rebels who were in opposition to the government. The RSF reportedly had 5,000 to 6,000 troops and 600 to 750 vehicles at the start of the campaign, though its numbers would grow. The second phase of the counterinsurgency campaign, which was announced in December 2014 and ended about mid-2015, saw the RSF active in the region of the Marrah Mountains (primarily in Central Darfur), as well as other areas in Sudan. During both phases of the campaign, the RSF frequently committed war crimes and crimes against humanity: RSF soldiers displaced entire villages, destroyed food and water sources, stole, tortured, raped, and engaged in extrajudicial executions.

The government used the RSF in other operations, such as deploying the group in 2015 and 2016 to patrol parts of the Sudanese border. In 2017 the government also tasked the RSF with carrying out disarmament campaigns across the country. It was during this time that the RSF seized a lucrative gold mine in northern Darfur, which would become a source of revenue for the group and its leader.

Meanwhile, in 2015 the United Arab Emirates (UAE) made a deal with Hemedti to send RSF troops to support allies of the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Yemen’s civil war. The arrangement proved profitable to Hemedti and the RSF, not only for the income generated from the troop deployment, but also for the relationships established with UAE and Saudi officials. The RSF and Hemedti also benefited from Al Junaid (also called Al Gunade), a holding company run by Hemedti’s family members to oversee and invest in a slew of business interests, including the mining and export of gold.

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Role in 2019 coup

The RSF served Bashir as a sort of praetorian guard, insulating the president against any coup attempts. Bashir even gave Hemedti an affectionate nickname: Himayti, meaning “My Protector.” This came to an end with the April 2019 coup, which was the culmination of mass protests that began in December 2018 when citizens expressed discontent about rising prices and Bashir’s regime. On April 11 Bashir was arrested by military forces, including the RSF. After the coup, Hemedti served as the deputy head of the Transitional Military Council that took power for several months before he became vice president of the new military-civilian Sovereign Council that was established in August. He was now one of the most powerful government officials in Sudan. In the following years, he embraced his power: meeting with foreign ambassadors, engaging in diplomatic talks with Sudanese rebels and opposition groups, and mediating a conflict in neighboring South Sudan. Some critics alleged that Hemedti was using the power afforded by his position in an attempt to rehabilitate the RSF’s reputation. The RSF continued to have a number of troops deployed outside Sudan, with some still fighting in Yemen and, in 2019, others fighting on behalf of the Libyan National Army in Libya’s civil conflict.

Clash with the Sudanese Armed Forces and civil war

Hemedti remained in his influential position after a second military coup in 2021 and the subsequent establishment of a new Sovereign Council. However, the new council’s blueprint for a transition to a democratic, civilian-led government put Hemedti on a collision course with the council’s president, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who also commanded the SAF. The source of their disagreement lay in part over plans for the RSF to be integrated into the SAF.

After months of escalating tension, violence broke out between the SAF and the RSF on April 15, 2023. Each side has accused the other of initiating the conflict. Hemedti suggested on the first day that the fighting would be over in “the next few days,” but the struggle instead evolved into a civil war that is still ongoing. The RSF appears to have the support of some neighboring countries, such as Chad, and has also received substantial financial support and weapons from the UAE, though the UAE denies this. The fighting has wreaked havoc on the country, causing the worst humanitarian crisis ever recorded by the International Rescue Committee. Moreover, both the RSF and the SAF have been accused of committing war crimes. The RSF in particular has been accused of genocide, engaging in the mass torture, rape, looting, and killing of non-Arab peoples in the areas it controls. Since 2023, several attempts at negotiating an end to the conflict have been made, including efforts by the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (a regional bloc), the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland.

In February 2025 the RSF and several allies signed a charter to form a new Sudanese government and in March were signatories to a transitional constitution. The move was criticized as an additional impediment to the peace process and was viewed as an attempt by Hemedti and the RSF to gain legitimacy as Sudan’s government so they could control the distribution of humanitarian aid and have greater access to purchasing weapons. On April 15, the second anniversary of the start of the civil war, Hemedti proclaimed the establishment of the “Government of Peace and Unity.”